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COMMENT 
FASTER. CHEAPER. 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: WHY THE 
PUBLIC’S SUBSIDY OF JOBSOHIO 
VIOLATES ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 4 
& 6 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION1 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 18, 2011, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed the 
129th Ohio Assembly House Bill 1 into law,2 authorizing the state to 
replace Ohio Department of Development activities with a new, 
private entity called JobsOhio.3 JobsOhio aims to attract jobs to the 
state and help local companies expand.4 It touts that by “[u]sing a 
                                                                                                                 
1 “Faster. Cheaper. Easier.” was the initial slogan for JobsOhio. See Tara Dodrill, 
JobsOhio Regional Rollout a Success, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 19, 2011), 
http://news.yahoo.com/jobsohio-regional-rollout-success-210500677.html (discussing 
JobsOhio’s slogan). As one official has remarked, “[JobsOhio] will allow us to move at the 
speed of the market, not at the speed of statute.” David Holthaus, JobsOhio is a Bold Break, 
THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 30, 2011, BIZ. 
2 Catherine Candisky, Kasich Privatizes Ohio Job Creation, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Feb. 19, 2011, at 1A. 
3 See Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (to be codified at 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 187.01) (“The governor is hereby authorized to form a nonprofit 
corporation, to be named “JobsOhio,” with the purposes of promoting economic development, 
job creation, job retention, job training, and the recruitment of business to this state.”). see also 
id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 187.03(A)) (“JobsOhio may perform such 
functions as permitted and shall perform such duties as prescribed by law, but shall not be 
considered a state or public department, agency, office, body, institution, or instrumentality for 
purposes of section 1.60 or Chapter 102., 121., 125., or 149. of the Revised Code.”).  
4 Candisky, supra note 2, at 1A.  
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private-sector approach, [it] will work at the speed of business, 
enabling Ohio to be more nimble and flexible and thus more 
competitive in its economic development efforts.”5 However, in its 
need for speed, JobsOhio cuts corners with the Ohio constitution.  
The Ohio Constitution contains multiple provisions designed to 
prohibit state funding of private enterprise,6 and this Comment 
focuses on two of them: article VIII, sections 4 and 6, as well as the 
exception found in section 13.7 Part I of this Comment explores a 
brief history behind the state’s adoption of article VIII, sections 4 and 
6, and analyzes Ohio courts’ jurisprudence interpreting and applying 
these provisions.8 Part II provides background and analysis on the 
function and purposes of House Bill 1 (“H.B. 1”), the enacting 
legislation for JobsOhio.9 Finally, Part III analyzes how article VIII, 
sections 4 and 6 apply to H.B. 1, and concludes that certain provisions 
of JobsOhio violate these sections of the Ohio Constitution.10 
I. HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF OHIO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE VIII 
A. Historical Background 
In the early 1800s, the young state of Ohio played an active role in 
developing its economy.11 State assistance took the form of public 
financing of private enterprise with the goal of developing a statewide 
transportation network, including railroads, canals, and turnpikes.12 
The public initially supported investments designed to expand the 
state’s access to markets, but that enthusiasm quickly soured.13 State-
subsidized corporations failed or squandered the government funds, 
leaving the public to bear the cost—and those costs were great.14 
                                                                                                                 
5 JOBSOHIO, JOBSOHIO OVERVIEW, 
http://www.ohioeda.com/pdf/mandiedirect/jobsohiooverview.pdf  
6 See infra note 27. 
7 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 6.  
8 See infra Part I. 
9 See infra Parts II and III. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See David M. Gold, Public Aid to Private Enterprise Under the Ohio Constitution: 
Sections 4, 6, and 13 of Article VIII in Historical Perspective, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 405, 407–08 
(1985) (describing the state government’s role in Ohio’s economic development in the early to 
mid-1800s, particularly in the establishment of a transportation network).  
12 Id. at 408–09 (noting that in 1837, the Ohio General Assembly passed the “Loan Law” 
that “required the state to give financial aid to private canal, turnpike, and railroad companies”). 
13 See Gold, supra note 11, at 409 (“Scattered skepticism about public and mixed 
enterprise began to turn to widespread revulsion against state involvement in economic 
affairs.”). 
14 See id. at 411 (“[Radical Democrats] were angered by the tax burdens imposed on 
citizens for the benefit of private companies and by the public losses incurred when subsidized 
corporations failed.”). 
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Between 1825 and 1830, Ohio’s debt increased “nearly eleven-fold, 
from $400,000 to $4,333,000.”15 
While the state’s debts accumulated, private transportation 
developers misused state funds.16 Massive inefficiencies resulted. It is 
estimated that less than half of the 30,000 miles of railroad built 
between 1880 and 1882 was necessary for development.17 Developers 
wasted public money building duplicate railroad lines, and, in some 
instances, never building the promised lines at all.18 Development 
was often uneven and only benefited certain regions of the state.19  
On top of the massive debt and inefficiencies, public financing of 
private enterprises resulted in widespread corruption.20 According to 
one scholar’s account, “railroads, through ‘practices of rate 
discrimination, favoritism, wastefully duplicated lines, stock 
gambling, frauds on investors, monopolies and political corruption’ 
constituted an ‘aid to plutocracy [and] a danger to the republic.’”21  
Public outcry over corruption and accumulation of debt, 
particularly among the anti-corporation Democrat party, contributed 
to the push for the 1850–51 state constitutional convention.22 This 
convention marked the start of a new era for the state, focused on 
reducing public support for private enterprise. As one commentator 
noted, “[i]t cannot be gainsaid that during the period from 1850 to 
about 1920, the judiciary and the legislative branch exerted 
prodigious efforts to prevent the entanglement of the government and 
the private sector in an attempt to insure that the government worked 
for the good of all the people.”23  
                                                                                                                 
15 Id. at 409; see also Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams—A 
Constitutional Disgrace. The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State Constitutional 
Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 395 
(1999) (noting that much of the increase in debt was due to the investment in railroad, which 
amounted to nearly $1.5 billion, “more than a quarter of the total active capital of the nation”). 
Ohio and Pennsylvania alone saw their combined debt escalate from $6.7 million in 1825 to $29 
million in 1836. Id. 
16 See Rubin, supra note 15, at 397 (“[T]he reason for the public’s outrage against public 
aid to private corporations was that tax money was being used to pay off the debt incurred 
resulting from the issuance of bonds, the proceeds of which were turned over to private 
companies, primarily railroads.”). 
17 Id. at 396.  
18 See Gold, supra note 11, at 411. 
19 Id. at 412. 
20 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 15, at 395 (noting that, particularly with railroad 
construction, bribery of public officials “seemed to be the norm”).  
21 Id. at 397. 
22 See Gold, supra note 11, at 411 (noting public disgust with government aid of private 
corporations was part of the motivation to hold a constitutional convention in 1850).  
23 Rubin, supra note 15, at 398 (citing Alfred F. Conard, Cook and the Corporate 
Shareholder: A Belated Review of William W. Cook’s Publications on Corporations, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1724, 1735 (1995)). 
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Ohio’s 1850–51 convention led to the adoption of a new 
constitution containing several provisions aimed to limit public aid 
for private endeavors.24 The resulting constitution, like many other 
constitutions that states adopted during a wave of mid-nineteenth-
century constitutional reforms, included numerous provisions 
designed to limit the use of public funds to support private 
enterprise.25 Among these are article VIII, sections 4 and 6.26  
B. Analysis of Article VIII, Sections 4 and 6 
Article VIII, sections 4 and 6 of the Ohio Constitution, as well as 
article VIII, section 13, which limits sections 4 and 6, are particularly 
relevant in analyzing the constitutionality of JobsOhio.27  
Even before implicating these constitutional provisions, at a 
minimum, public funds in Ohio must be spent for a public purpose.28 
In determining whether public funds support a public purpose, the 
Ohio Supreme Court gives great deference to the legislature and will 
only overturn a legislative determination based on a “manifestly 
arbitrary or unreasonable” standard.29 Despite the Court’s great 
                                                                                                                 
24 See id. (“[T]he enactment of the state constitutional provisions prohibit[ed] special 
legislation, lending of credit, and requiring uniformity of taxation.”). While beyond the scope of 
this Comment, in additional to the provisions mentioned above, there are other constitutional 
requirements placing limits on the use of public funds for private enterprise. For example, 
article XIII, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution confers corporate powers and states “[t]he 
general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.” OHIO CONST. art. XIII, 
§ 1. Related is article XIII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, entitled, “General corporation 
laws; regulation of corporations; sale or transfer of personal property” and allows corporations 
be formed under general laws. Id. at § 2. Article VIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution 
concerns creation of debt and states (in part), that with some exceptions, “no debt whatever shall 
hereafter be created by or on behalf of the state.” OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 3. Lastly, article VIII, 
section 5 of the Ohio Constitution, entitled “State not to assume debts of political subdivisions; 
exceptions” articulates the following: “The state shall never assume the debts of any county, 
city, town, or township, or of any corporation whatever, unless such debt shall have been 
created to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend the state in war.” Id. at § 5. 
25 See Rubin, supra note 15, at 393 (noting that almost all state constitutions prohibit the 
public subsidies to private enterprises such as sport stadiums).  
26 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 6 (specifically, article VIII, section 4, prohibits the state 
from financial involvement in a private enterprise, and article VIII, section 6 bans counties, 
cities, townships from financing private enterprises). See infra Part I.A for the full provisions of 
OHIO CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 6. For an excellent overview of the full history of article VIII, 
sections 4 and 6 of the Ohio Constitution, see Gold, supra note 13, at 412–422. 
27 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 6, 13. 
28 State ex rel. Taft v. Campanella, 368 N.E.2d 76, 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 1977), aff’d, 364 
N.E.2d 21 (Ohio 1977) (“It is clear that a county's funds or credit may not be used to finance a 
private purpose or a private interest. Purely governmental functions performed by non-private 
entities, however, may be financed by county funds or county credit.”). 
29 Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 868–69 (Ohio 1968) (“The determination 
of what constitutes a public municipal purpose is primarily a function of the legislative body of 
the municipality subject to review by the courts, and such determination by the legislative body 
will not be overruled by the courts except in instances where that determination is manifestly 
arbitrary or unreasonable." (citing Gordon v. Rhodes, 100 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Ohio 1951)). 
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deference to the legislature in determining what constitutes a public 
purpose, any legislative scheme must still overcome the restrictions of 
article VIII, Sections 4 and 6.  
In particular, sections 4 and 6 create an additional hurdle by (1) 
prohibiting joint ownership between the government and private 
entities, (2) prohibiting private financial gain, and (3) prohibiting 
government subsidies for commerce or industry. These prohibitions 
are relevant to JobsOhio because while its proponents may argue the 
program constitutes a public purpose, the program cannot overcome 
the hurdle created by section 4 and 6 because JobsOhio authorizes 
joint ownership between the state and private entities, fosters private 
financial gain, and allows for government subsidy of commerce in 
violation of the Ohio constitution.  
1. Article VIII—Public Debts and Public Works 
Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution concerns “Public Debts and 
Public Works.”30 In Grendell v. Ohio Environmental Protection 
Agency, an Ohio court of appeals described article VIII as “an 
expression of concern with placing public tax dollars at risk to aid 
private enterprise . . . [and an] interest in not placing state tax dollars 
at risk in unwise investments.”31 Specifically, article VIII, sections 4 
and 6 prohibit the government from using public funds to finance 
private enterprise, whether at the state or the county or township 
level.32 Article VIII, section 4 of the Ohio Constitution states the 
following:  
The credit of the state shall not, in any manner, be given or 
loaned to, or in aid of, any individual association or 
corporation whatever; nor shall the state ever hereafter 
become a joint owner, or stockholder, in any company or 
association, in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any 
purpose whatever.33  
Similarly, article VIII, section 6 also bans public financing of private 
enterprises, but does so only at the city, town, or township level: 
No laws shall be passed authorizing any county, city, town or 
township, by vote of its citizens, or otherwise, to become a 
stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation, or 
                                                                                                                 
30 OHIO CONST. art. VIII. 
31 764 N.E.2d 1067, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
32 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 6.  
33 Id. at § 4. 
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association whatever; or to raise money for, or to loan its 
credit to, or in aid of, any such company, corporation, or 
association: provided, that nothing in this section shall 
prevent the insuring of public buildings or property in mutual 
insurance associations or companies. Laws may be passed 
providing for the regulation of all rates charged or to be 
charged by any insurance company, corporation or 
association organized under the laws of this state, or doing 
any insurance business in this state for profit.34  
a. Sections 4 and 6 Prohibit Joint Ownership 
The Ohio Supreme Court first interpreted article VIII, section 6 in 
Alter v. City of Cincinnati.35 Alter concerned the constitutionality of a 
waterworks act authorizing the city of Cincinnati to contract with a 
corporation for the expansion of water services, as well as to confer 
joint ownership of the waterworks with the corporation.36 The Alter 
Court interpreted section 6 to mean that “[t]here can be no union of 
public and private funds or credit, nor of that which is produced by 
such funds or credit.”37 
In applying the rule prohibiting the union of public and private 
funds, the Alter court determined that the joint-ownership provision 
of the act was unconstitutional, stating:  
[section 6] not only prohibits a “business partnership,” . . . but 
it goes further, and prohibits a municipality from being the 
owner of part of a property which is owned and controlled in 
part by a corporation or individual . . . [a] union of public and 
private funds or credit, each in aid of the other, is forbidden 
by the constitution.38 
Furthermore, In State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna,39 the 
Ohio Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning of “joint venture” to 
                                                                                                                 
34 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 6. Section 6 is entitled “Political subdivisions to avoid 
financial involvement with private enterprise; mutual insurance exception” 
35 46 N.E. 69, 70 (Ohio 1897) (“The full scope of this section of the constitution has not 
yet been determined by this court.”). 
36 Id. at 71 (“[T]he enlargements, extensions, improvements, and additions, together with 
the existing works, all taken together, will constitute one completed whole,—one waterworks 
system, one waterworks,—owned in part by the city, and in part by the individual or 
corporation; and thereby the union of public and private capital and funds in one enterprise will 
become complete.”). 
37 Id. at 70.  
38 Id. (emphasis added). 
39 459 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ohio 1984).  
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hold that a municipality’s financing of an enterprise in ways favorable 
to the private entity constituted “joint ownership,” which the state 
constitution prohibited.40 In Ryan, the city of Gahanna purchased and 
developed an industrial park, financing it by issuing notes. The notes 
“were issued in anticipation of long-term bonds, at a favorable rate to 
private corporations,” and the Court concluded that “[t]his [was] as 
much a joint enterprise as if the city . . . had given the money directly 
to the corporations to develop the land, to construct their buildings 
and to carry on their activities in the industrial park.”41 
Simply put, the Ohio Supreme Court has affirmed that the 
“primary purpose” of article VIII, section 6 “is to prohibit the use of 
county funds or credit for private purposes . . . [in that it] shall not be 
used for economic gain by private interests.”42 Sections 4 and 6 
always “forbid [the] government to hold stock in private companies 
or to raise money for or [to] loan its credit to private individuals or 
businesses.”43 
One rationale for the prohibition on the union of private and public 
funds is the desire for full governmental control. As the Alter court 
wrote:  
[t]he whole ownership and control must be in the public. . . . 
[A city] cannot engage in an enterprise with an individual or 
corporation for the construction…of a property which, as a 
completed whole, is to be owned and controlled in part by the 
city, and in part by an individual or corporation.44  
Ohio courts have consistently looked to the degree of 
governmental control over ownership when deciding whether an 
enterprise is in the public interest.45  
                                                                                                                 
40 Id. at 210.  
41 Id.  
42 State ex rel. Taft v. Campanella, 368 N.E.2d 76, 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 1977), aff’d, 364 
N.E.2d 21 (Ohio 1977). 
43 Gold, supra note 11, at 460. 
44 Alter v. City of Cincinnati, 46 N.E. 69, 70 (Ohio 1897).  
45 Id. at 71 (“The existing waterworks would be so tied to the extensions as to be 
dependent upon them, and the extensions would be so tied to the existing works as to be of but 
little value without them. It is this close connection and dependence one upon the other that 
constitutes both together as a single whole, and makes a union of public and private funds and 
credit.”); cf, Bazell, 233 N.E.2d at 871 (holding that a stadium built, controlled and funded by 
the municipality which is rented to private individuals is not in violation of the Ohio 
constitution); Taft, 368 N.E.2d at 83 (concluding that the use of county credit to fund a hospital 
is a public interest, because the project is governmental and because the county would own and 
lease the facilities). 
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b. Sections 4 and 6 Prohibit Private Financial Gain 
In State ex rel. Wilson v. Hance, the Ohio Supreme Court 
invalidated contracts that involved the union of government and 
private property, where a private entity benefitted financially.46 The 
Court once again emphasized the loss of governmental control present 
in such a situation, stating, “[u]nder the terms of the mortgage, the 
administrator of R.E.A. can, if he so desires, take control of this part 
of the plant, thereby removing such control from the city.”47 
However, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished Wilson in Bazell 
v. City of Cincinnati.48 There, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that 
there may be narrow instances where a private party may derive 
profits, stating that a municipality may rent out:  
[a municipally funded stadium designed] to accommodate 
large crowds at athletic and other exhibitions . . . to private 
persons who will provide such exhibitions; that the 
municipality may do so even though such private persons will 
derive profits from providing those exhibitions; that, in 
connection with the construction and operation of such a 
stadium, a municipality may acquire land and devote it to 
automobile parking and derive a profit from doing so; and 
that, as an incident to the construction and operation of such 
stadium, a municipality may construct and maintain a 
scoreboard and derive revenue from the sale of advertising 
space thereon.49 
One key point in Bazell, however, is that the city’s scheme 
provided money to a county, not to a private entity.50 The Court noted 
this, stating “although [section 6] forbids the lending of a city's credit 
to or in aid of a private business enterprise . . . it does not prohibit 
such lending by a city to a public organization such as a county.”51 In 
Bazell, the private entity’s profits were incidental, were not derived 
                                                                                                                 
46 159 N.E.2d 741, 747 (Ohio 1959). (“[T]he contract involved in the present action 
clearly violates the provisions of Section 6 of Article VIII of the Constitution of Ohio.”). Wilson 
concerned the city’s transfer of land to Pioneer Rural Electric Co-operative, Inc., which placed a 
mortgage on the land and then returned it to the city (subject to the mortgage). Id. at 746. The 
Court held that unlike a situation where a city was merely leasing land to a private company, the 
case instead involved “union of property owned by Pioneer and property owned by the city of 
Piqua, from which the net proceeds of sales to Pioneer, and more, are to be paid to Pioneer in 
the form of the payment of its . . . loan.” Id. at 746–47. 
47 Id. at 746. 
48 233 N.E.2d at 864. 
49 Id. at 870.  
50 Id. at 871. 
51 Id.  
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from the sale of land, and did not subject the city or state to loss of 
control over ownership of land or decision making related to the 
operation of the enterprise.  
c. Sections 4 and 6 Prohibit Government Subsidies for Commerce or 
Industry  
In addition to prohibiting state or county subsidies for private 
purposes, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that article VIII, 
sections 4 and 6 “have been uniformly held to prohibit governmental 
involvement only in ventures that subsidize commerce or industry.”52 
For instance, the Court has upheld public financing of subsidized 
housing for low-income individuals as constituting a public purpose, 
which did not violate article VIII, sections 4 and 6.53 The Court 
stated, “[l]ending credit to purchasers of subsidized housing is such a 
subsidy, not a business venture. Accordingly, it is not prohibited by 
article VIII, section 6 of the Ohio Constitution.”54 
Ohio courts have upheld subsidies for other nonprofit entities that 
did not constitute business ventures, including Ohio’s allocation of 
funds to a veterans’ organization that the state used for over a 
generation for representing veterans’ claims to the Veterans 
Administration.55 Ohio courts have also allowed the funding of a 
nonprofit entity for the operation of a public zoo that a municipality 
owned56 and homeless services that a municipality contracted to a 
nonprofit organization, when the municipality could provide those 
services itself.57 
                                                                                                                 
52 State ex rel. Tomino v. Brown, 549 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ohio 1989) (noting that 
historically sections 4 and 6 have not been applied to cases concerning public welfare, but have 
uniformly prohibited the subsidy of commercial ventures). 
53 Id. (holding that city’s issue of revenue notes for housing construct was not 
unconstitutional because it was undertaken for welfare purposes and not a business purpose).  
54 Id. at 509.  
55 State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 128 N.E.2d 59, 65 (Ohio 1955) (“It has been 
held on numerous occasions by the courts of other states . . . . that Section 4, Article VIII of our 
state Constitution . . . enjoin[s] the making of appropriations for private enterprises, but that the 
appropriation of public money to a private corporation to be expended for a public purpose is a 
valid act of the legislative body.”). 
56 See McGuire v. City of Cincinnati, 40 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st 1941) (“All 
the expenditures, all the activities here relate to public property controlled by public authority 
and operated for a public purpose, through the agency selected and controlled by such public 
authority. So we conclude that there is no inherent constitutional defect in the arrangement 
between the City and the Zoological Society.”). 
57 Franklinton Coal. v. Open Shelter, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 861, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th 1983) 
(“[I]t is appropriate for a political subdivision to contract with a nonprofit corporation to provide 
services to the inhabitants of the political subdivision that could be provided by the municipality 
itself as a public service.”). 
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In each of these instances the courts upheld the public subsidy not 
simply because the case involved a nonprofit service in the public 
interest, but also because these schemes did not utilize public funds 
for business ventures, they allowed the state to retain control and 
ownership, and they did not subject taxpayer dollars to enterprises 
that would result in private gain. This distinction is particularly 
relevant to JobsOhio, which is also configured as a nonprofit.58 Based 
on these precedents, JobsOhio’s nonprofit status is not sufficient to 
demonstrate its constitutionality. Proponents must also demonstrate 
that the state is not using public funds to underwrite business 
ventures, allow funds to be used for private gain, or involve joint 
ownership with a private entity. 
2. Article VIII, Section 13: The Exception to Article VIII, Sections 4 
and 6 
Any discussion of article VIII, sections 4 and 6 should also 
consider that article VIII, section 13 provides an exception to bans on 
public funding of private enterprise.59 Article VIII, section 13 
identifies the promotion of economic development through acquiring, 
constructing, selling, or leasing industrial or commercial property or 
facilities and by financing the acquisition or construction through 
borrowing, issuing bonds, or making or guaranteeing loans.60 
As one commentator notes, “the avowed purpose of section 13 is 
to make possible the acquisition, construction, or improvement of 
‘property, structures equipment, and facilities’—that is, capital 
assets—for ‘industry, commerce, distribution, and research.’”61 For 
                                                                                                                 
58 See supra note 3. 
59 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 13; see also Gold, supra note 11, at 462–63 (“If a proposed 
use of public funds for a public purpose falls under the prohibitions of section 4 or 6, it may 
nevertheless be constitutional under the exceptions to these provisions contained in section 
13.”).  
60 The amendment states: 
To create or preserve jobs and employment opportunities, to improve the economic 
welfare of the people of the state, to control air, water, and thermal pollution, or to 
dispose of solid waste, it is hereby determined to be in the public interest and a 
proper public purpose for the state or its political subdivisions, taxing districts, or 
public authorities, its or their agencies or instrumentalities, or corporations not for 
profit designated by any of them as such agencies or instrumentalities, to acquire, 
construct, enlarge, improve, or equip, and to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise 
dispose of property, structures, equipment, and facilities within the State of Ohio for 
industry, commerce, distribution, and research, to make or guarantee loans and to 
borrow money and issue bonds or other obligations to provide moneys for the 
acquisition, construction, enlargement, improvement, or equipment, of such 
property, structures, equipment and facilities. 
OHIO CONST. art. VIII, §13. 
61 Gold, supra note 11, at 457 (quoting OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 13). 
 2/13/2012 4:05:38 PM 
2012] FASTER. CHEAPER. UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 929 
this reason, article VIII, section 13 carves out an exception to the 
absolute prohibition of public-private enterprises of concern to 
sections 4 and 6.  
II. OHIO’S MODERN DAY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: H.B. 1 
“JOBSOHIO” 
In November 2010, Ohioans elected officials who ran on a 
platform of economic reforms focused on privatizing Ohio’s 
Department of Development.62 Ohio’s reforms centered around the 
goal of “transfer[ing] state activities designed to attract new 
investment—and thus new jobs—from government agencies to 
private entities described as quasi-public or public-private 
partnerships (‘PPPs’).”63 Although politicians promoted the initiatives 
as a fresh new idea,64 some states have had similar programs in place 
for as long as twenty years.65 In fact, today there are currently PPPs in 
seven states: Florida, Rhode Island, Virginia, Michigan, Wyoming, 
Indiana, and Utah.66  
PPPs occupy “a gray area between the public and private sectors” 
in that they are a form of nonprofit entity “free from bureaucratic 
strictures while serving the public interest.”67 Despite high hopes for 
these reforms, several states with PPPs “abandoned them due to 
performance problems.”68 One organization’s analysis of former and 
current PPPs found that states often encounter a number of practical 
difficulties, including misuse of taxpayer funds, excessive executive 
bonuses, questionable subsidy awards, conflicts of interests in subsidy 
awards, possible ineffectiveness, and resistance to accountability.69 
In February, 2011, as discussed above, Ohio Governor John 
Kasich signed into law H.B. 1,70 amending sections 1.60, 102.01, 
                                                                                                                 
62 PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, PUBLIC-PRIVATE POWER GRAB: THE RISKS 
IN PRIVATIZING STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES, 2–3 (January 2011), 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/powergrab.pdf. The enactment of JobsOhio is part of a larger 
trend, with Arizona, Wisconsin and Iowa also introducing proposals similar to Ohio’s H.B. 1. 
Id. at i. 
63 Id. at 1.  
64 Kasich’s campaign website described JobsOhio as “A New Vision for Reviving and 
Growing Ohio’s Economy.” JobsOhio Plan, KASICH TAYLOR FOR OHIO, 
http://www.kasichforohio.com/site/c.hpIJKWOCJqG/b.6186591/k.9589/JobsOhio_Plan.htm 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2011). The media has also described JobsOhio as a “bold break.” Holthaus, 
supra note 1.  
65 MATTERA ET AL., supra note 62, at 4.  
66 Id. at 7. 
67 Id. at 14. 
68 Id. at i. 
69 Id. at i–ii. 
70 Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011); see also Candisky, 
supra note 2, at 1A. 
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102.02, 102.022, 117.01, 121.01, 121.22, 121.41, 121.60, 121.67, 
122.011, 124.01, 145.012, 149.011, 2921.01, and 4117.01 and 
enacting sections 187.01 to 187.12 of the Ohio Revised Code. The 
bill authorizes Kasich and the Kasich administration’s Development 
Director to replace the Ohio Department of Development with a 
newly formed PPP, JobsOhio.71  
JobsOhio is set up as a nonprofit entity governed by a nine-
member board appointed by the governor,72 “responsible for the 
promotion of economic development, job creation, job retention, job 
training and the recruitment of businesses to Ohio.”73 In July 2011, 
Kasich announced the appointed board members,74 a panel that The 
Columbus Dispatch described as “[r]ich in business acumen and thick 
with ties” to Kasich.75 While specific details regarding JobsOhio’s 
implementation are still emerging (and not always publicized), the 
Department of Development’s recommendations to the Ohio General 
Assembly, published on August 18, 2011, contains some details.76 
The plan, thus far, requires the Ohio legislature to divide the state into 
six regions in which “[l]ocal economic development groups . . . 
would partner with JobsOhio to spur job growth and keep employers 
from leaving the state” with “[m]uch of the focus . . . on technology 
and innovation.”77 
The funding for H.B. 1 consists of $1 million in startup financing 
that the Ohio General Assembly allocated to the program, and the 
profits from Ohio’s wholesale liquor enterprise, which JobsOhio 
leased from the state for twenty-five years.78 This financing 
arrangement is, of course, premised on the idea that JobsOhio 
investments will generate sufficient profits to pay the state back. 
Architects of JobsOhio expect it to pay $1.2 billion, with “$700 
                                                                                                                 
71 See supra note 3 
72 Joe Vardon, JobsOhio Board Members Share Links to Governor, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, July 12, 2011, at 1A [hereinafter Links to Governor]. 
73 See OHIO DEP’T OF DEV., REPORT TO THE OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY PURSUANT TO 
ORC SECTION 187.05 2 (2011) [hereinafter Dep’t of Dev. Report]. 
74 See About Us, JOBSOHIO, http://jobs-ohio.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) 
(listing current board members, including James C. Boland, Steven A. Davis, and E. Gordon 
Gee).  
75 Links to Governor, supra note 72. In particular, board member Gordon Gee and Kasich 
are “friends and are often partners in public business.” Id. Kasich gave board members Steven 
Davis and Gary Heminger tax incentives to keep their companies in the state. Additionally, 
Kasich served as a board member of another board member’s company, and is working with yet 
another board member (Martin Harris) to advance medical industry needs. Id. 
76 See generally Dep’t of Dev. Report, supra note 73 (outlining proposed regulatory and 
statutory changes necessary to implement the JobsOhio program).  
77 Julie Carr Smyth, Private JobsOhio Move Will Cost 211 State Jobs, BLOOMBURG 
BUSINESS WEEK (August 19, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9P752180.htm. 
78 JOBSOHIO OVERVIEW, supra note 5. 
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million to pay off debt backed by liquor profits, and $500 million to 
the state general fund.”79 However, this estimation is not without its 
critics, including The Plain Dealer which questions “whether 
mortgaging liquor profits to a long-term bond deal risks saddling 
taxpayers with excessive debt payments,” and warns that “a JobsOhio 
deal must be priced and timed just right or taxpayers will have 
bartered a steady earner for a speculative investment.”80  
Some critics are also concerned about H.B. 1’s lack of 
transparency and accountability. For instance, H.B. 1 was written to 
purposely shield JobsOhio employees from ethics provision of the 
Ohio Revised Code.81 The Cincinnati Enquirer described this as “a 
veil of secrecy” for an operation that is more private than public, with 
a law “carefully constructed” to keep much of the activity secret.82 
The extent of H.B. 1’s secrecy is problematic. For example, under the 
authorizing legislation, JobsOhio is not classified as a public 
employer; therefore, the employees are not considered public 
servants.83 And while board members must file financial disclosure 
statements, they are kept confidential.84 There are no restrictions, 
including state-residency requirements, on whom the governor may 
appoint.85 While the board needs to hold four open meetings a year, 
they can be closed “to consider business strategy of the corporation” 
and for other reasons.86  
Supporters of JobsOhio assert that privacy provisions meant to 
limit public exposure “are vital because they allow negotiations to 
take place without business plans becoming public,” and they prevent 
companies from being at risk for a public records request.87 In 
practice, however, concealing business recruitment efforts makes it 
                                                                                                                 
79 Jim Siegel, How Will the Budget Affect You? THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 3, 2011, 
at 1A. 
80 Editorial, Close Scrutiny for JobsOhio, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 29, 2011, at G2. 
81 See Sub. H.B. 1, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (to be codified at OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 187.03 (B)(1)) (“With the exception of the governor, directors and 
employees of JobsOhio are not employees or officials of the state and, except as provided in 
division (B)(2) of this section, are not subject to Chapter 102., 124., 145., or 4117. of the 
Revised Code.”).  
82 Holthaus, supra note 1. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 The governor came under fire for this. The Governor’s first pick for director was Mark 
Kvamme, “a wealthy venture capitalist from California and long-time friend of Kasich’s.” Id. 
However, at the time of appointment Kvamme was not a resident of Ohio, and a lawsuit 
contended that H.B. 1 violates the Ohio Constitution’s residency requirements. See Links to 
Governor, supra note 72, at A6 (“Kvamme, 51, was picked to be Kasich's development director 
but was moved into Kasich's office as director of job creation after ProgressOhio sued over his 
then-status as a California resident.”).  
86 Holthaus, supra note 1. 
87 Id. 
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susceptible to fraud. One study of state efforts to privatize economic 
development found several instances of abuse and fraud with business 
recruitment initiatives, particularly among states with “mediocre” 
disclosure provisions.88 Two of the states with limited disclosure 
laws, Texas and Florida, had documented conflicts of interest 
problems, with funds being awarded to board members’ companies, 
or to campaign contributors.89 In Florida, the St. Petersburg Times 
conducted an extensive investigation of Florida’s privatized economic 
development program, Enterprise Florida, and described it as “a 
public-private venture only in the sense that the public pays and the 
private receives. Despite critical audits, legislative questions and 
gubernatorial promises of reform, the group has proved to be virtually 
immune to the normal checks and balances.”90 
Ohio is vulnerable to the same risks of abuse of funds. One 
commentator’s analysis demonstrates that Governor Kasich and the 
Republican Party’s campaign committees have accepted nearly half a 
million dollars in contributions from those very organizations that 
will be receiving grants from JobsOhio.91 And as the complaint filed 
against the state notes, “[s]uch investments do not involve 
commingling but instead provid[e] value, whether cash or by other 
means, in exchange for an asset, namely an equity position.”92 While 
these relationships may not necessarily result in wrongdoing, strong 
accountability and transparency would go a long way in providing 
assurance to taxpayers that officials are not engaging in pay-to-play 
politics or otherwise misusing funds.  
                                                                                                                 
88 See MATTERA ET AL. supra note 62, at 12. Four states given “mediocre” disclosure 
systems included Florida, Rhode Island, Utah and Virginia. Id. 
89 Id. at 9–10.  
90 MATTERA ET AL., supra note 62, at 10 (internal citation omitted).  
91 See Dave Harding, Kasich To Give Public Money To Private Groups Supporting His 
Agenda, PROGRESSOHIO.ORG (August 29, 2011 11:30 AM), 
http://www.progressohio.org/blog/2011/08/kasich-to-give-public-money-to-private-groups-
supporting-his-agenda.html (“[S]upporters of SB5 and Republican committees received 
contributions from board members of Team NEO, Dayton Development Coalition, Cincinnati 
USA Partnership, Greater Cleveland Partnership and the businesses associated with board 
members who were CEOs or presidents. Board members of the Greater Cleveland Partnership 
topped the list of donors, giving $372,040.92 to pro-SB5 lawmakers and Republican 
committees. Of that, $144,685 came from KeyCorp. Team NEO—which is in line to share part 
of $24 million in Third Frontier money—has close ties to the Partnership and receives 
significant financial support from it.”) (utilizing analysis from JobsOhio/SB5 Supporters 
Research: Recipients that Endorsed SB5, PROGRESSOHIO.ORG, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/63499225/JobsOhio-SB5-Supporters-Research-Recipients-That-
Endorsed-SB5 (last visited Dec. 28, 2011)). 
92 ProgressOhio.org,, Inc. v. JobsOhio, No. 11 CVH 08 10807 (Franklin Cnty. Ct. Com. 
Pl. filed August 29, 2011); see also Dep’t of Dev. Report, supra note 73, at 11 (discussing 
campaign contributions from firms that seek to benefit from Third Frontier grants administered 
by JobsOhio).  
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In addition to the criticism concerning the lack of accountability 
and transparency, the state also faces legal action challenging the 
constitutionality of JobsOhio. On April 18, 2011, ProgressOhio.org, 
along with one member of both the Ohio House and Senate filed suit 
against the state, challenging the constitutionality of JobsOhio.93 In an 
apparent response to some of the suit’s charges, the Kasich 
administration submitted amendments to H.B. 1 in June 2011 that 
addressed some of the provisions at issue.94  
In August 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court declared section 3 of 
H.B. 1 unconstitutional.95 Section 3 conferred exclusive, original 
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Ohio.96 Writing on section 3, the 
Court stated, “[n]either legislation nor rule of court can expand our 
jurisdiction under Section 2, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.”97 
The Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
and Progress Ohio re-filed the suit in Court of Common Pleas, 
Franklin County Ohio.98  
                                                                                                                 
93 Originally filed with the Ohio Supreme Court, the case was filed with and later 
dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County Ohio for lack of standing, a decision 
that is currently being appealed. ProgressOhio.org v. JobsOhio, No. 11 CVH 08 01807 (Franklin 
Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. filed August 29, 2011). This suit challenges the constitutionality of JobsOhio 
on multiple grounds, including that: (1) HB 1 is a special act conferring corporate powers in 
violation of article XIII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, and (2) that it violates article VIII, 
section 4 of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 3. 
94 Joe Vardon & Jim Siegel, Kasich's Senate-Budget Amendments Strip Him of JobsOhio 
Powers, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 6, 2011, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/06/06/amendments-kasich-submitted-to-
senate-budget-strip-him-of-jobsohio-powers.html. 
95 See ProgressOhio.org v. JobsOhio, No. 2011–Ohio–4101, slip op. at 1 (Ohio 2011) (per 
curiam) (“Section 3 of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 is unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to 
confer exclusive, original jurisdiction on this court to consider the constitutionality of the act’s 
provisions—Cause dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 
96 Id. at 3 (citing Am. Sub. H.B. 1, Section 3, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 
2011). Section 3 of H.B. 1 states:  
The Supreme Court of Ohio shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any claim 
asserting that any one or more sections of the Revised Code amended or enacted by 
this act, or any portion of one or more of those sections, or any rule adopted under 
one or more of those sections, violates any provision of the Ohio Constitution; and 
over any claim asserting that any action taken pursuant to those sections by the 
Governor or the nonprofit corporation formed under section 187.01 of the Revised 
Code violates any provision of the Ohio Constitution or any provision of the Revised 
Code. Any such claim shall be filed as otherwise required by the Court’s rules of 
practice not later than the sixtieth day after the effective date of this act. If any claim 
over which the Supreme Court is granted exclusive, original jurisdiction by this 
section is filed in any lower court, the claim shall be dismissed by the court on the 
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to review it. 
97 ProgressOhio.org, No. 2011–Ohio–4101 at 3.  
98 ProgressOhio.org v. JobsOhio, No. 11 CVH 08 10807 (Franklin Ctny. Ct. Com. Pl. 
filed Aug. 29, 2011). 
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III. APPLICATION OF OHIO’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS TO 
JOBSOHIO 
While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to explore all the 
constitutional issues implicated by H.B. 1, this Comment seeks to 
analyze how article VIII, sections 4 and 6 applies to an entity such as 
JobsOhio.99 Because of JobsOhio’s joint ownership between the state 
and private entities, the loss of governmental decision making and 
authority, and subsidies to commerce provisions, H.B. 1 violates 
article VIII, sections 4 and 6 of the Ohio Constitution.  
A. H.B. 1 Establishes Joint Ownership Between the Government and 
Private Enterprise in Violation of Article VIII, Sections 4 and 6. 
As discussed in Part I, the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted 
Ohio Constitution article VIII, sections 4 and 6 to mean that “[t]here 
can be no union of public and private funds or credit, nor of that 
which is produced by such funds or credit.”100 In direct violation of 
this long-standing rule, JobsOhio intends to solicit private funds to 
help finance the initiative, in addition to the public funds it is 
receiving.101 The Ohio Department of Development’s August 2011 
report to the Ohio General Assembly outlines the entity’s plan:  
JobsOhio’s work will begin gradually in August 2011, and 
will accelerate to its full potential in early 2012. After that 
time, it will use private funds to incentivize businesses to 
locate to or expand in Ohio, aiding in job creation and 
retention. Additionally, JobsOhio will include tax credits as 
part of the incentive packages offered to businesses, with 
final approval authority remaining with the state.102 
                                                                                                                 
99 Even though H.B. 1 involves the use of state funds, and therefore implicates article 
VIII, section 4 rather than article VIII, section 6 this comment’s analysis will rely upon Ohio 
courts’ interpretation of both sections 4 and 6, since Ohio courts have explicitly used case law 
from both provisions interchangeably. See State ex rel. Eichenberger v. Neff, 330 N.E.2d 454, 
458 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th 1974) (interpreting the meaning given to section 6 to be equally 
applicable to the State under section 4).  
100 Alter v. City of Cincinnati, 46 N.E. 69, 70 (Ohio 1897).  
101 See JOBSOHIO OVERVIEW, supra note 5 (“Funding: The Ohio General Assembly has 
appropriated $1 million for the start-up of JobsOhio. Long-term funding for JobsOhio and its 
economic development activities comes from Ohio’s wholesale liquor enterprise, which will be 
transferred to JobsOhio for 25 years. JobsOhio also can receive additional public and private 
funds.”) (emphasis added); see also, Reginald Fields, Kasich Introduces JobsOhio; Board 
Focuses on Development, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 12, 2011, at B1 (“The private board will 
operate with both taxpayer and private money….[and in addition to appropriated funds and 
lucrative liquor sales] the board is seeking private investors.”). 
102 Dep’t of Dev. Report, supra note 73, at 16. 
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According to multiple media accounts, Mark Kvamme, JobsOhio 
interim CIO along with the staff of JobsOhio “will . . . be the primary 
fundraisers for the $10 million to $15 million pool of private money 
that will be used to invest. . . . from private companies that stand to 
benefit from job expansion, such as banks, utilities and insurance 
firms.”103  
It is hard to imagine a more direct violation of the Court’s 
prohibition on joint ownership. JobsOhio’s combination of private 
and public money creates a “union of public and private funds” 
prohibited by Alter.104 Joint financing makes the state a “part-owner” 
of the venture, thereby subjecting the state to loss of total ownership 
and control of the initiative, in violation of Alter’s requirement that 
“the whole ownership and control must be in the public.”105 Of 
course, the Kasich administration may argue that it is taking steps to 
prevent the commingling of money, thereby avoiding constitutional 
concerns.106 However, the Ohio Supreme Court has not been 
primarily concerned simply with the commingling of funds, but the 
state’s loss of decision-making control and exposure to financial 
risks.  
Indeed, the manner in which JobsOhio will conduct its decision 
making also speaks to the very type of scenario that sections 4 and 6 
seek to prevent: the loss of decision-making authority by the state. 
For instance, the August 18, 2011 Ohio Department of 
Development’s report to the General Assembly recommends changes 
in decision-making authority, allowing the state to cede control of 
grant and tax incentive allocation to local development organizations. 
While the state will retain “approval authority” for tax credits, 
“JobsOhio should be authorized to offer grants and tax incentives.”107 
The report states that “[l]ocal development organizations would 
prefer to work with one point of contact [and] JobsOhio should be 
that contact, with expedited approval processes and servicing of 
transactions centralized and perhaps outsourced to a third party.”108  
                                                                                                                 
103 See Holthaus, supra note 1.  
104 Alter v. City of Cincinnati, 46 N.E. at 70.  
105 Id. 
106 For instance, the administration may point to a provision in H.B. 1 stating that private 
funds coming into JobsOhio should not be mingled with public money. See Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 
129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 187.07) 
(“At no time shall any public money coming into the possession of JobsOhio be commingled 
with other money of the corporation, and any funds or accounts of the corporation that hold 
public money shall be maintained and accounted for separately and independently from any 
other funds or accounts of the corporation.”). 
107 Dep’t of Dev. Report, supra note 73, at 10. 
108 Id. at 11. In addition, the report recommends that the Office of Business Development 
move to JobsOhio. According to the report, “This office provides the interface for businesses 
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While the report notes that JobsOhio will determine the 
“recommended level of incentives that will go into the package 
presented to business,” the report indicates that the task of approving 
the final set of incentives and working closely with the appropriate 
authorities in other state agencies “should remain with the state.”109 
Though the Department of Development will have some final 
decision-making authority (at least with regard to tax credits), it is not 
clear whether the state will simply be a “rubber stamp” for decisions 
made by JobsOhio officials.  
In addition to this decision-making arrangement running afoul of 
the state constitution, the state’s loss of control over the allocation of 
tax credits and grants is vulnerable to fraud and corruption. One study 
found that two states with privatized economic development 
programs similar to JobsOhio, Michigan and Rhode Island, both 
experienced “big scandals” with regard to their tax subsidy awards.110 
In Michigan, the Michigan Economic Development Corporation 
approved a $9 million subsidy for a project headed by a convicted 
embezzler, and Rhode Island’s similar program approved a $75 
million loan for what both of the state’s gubernatorial candidates 
described as a “risky videogame venture.”111 The loss of state control 
over allocation of funds is not only unconstitutional but unwise 
policy.  
B. H.B. 1 Subsidizes Commerce in Violation of Article VIII, Sections 4 
and 6. 
In addition to concerns with funding and decision making, H.B. 1 
also constitutes a subsidy of commerce in violation of article VIII, 
sections 4 and 6.112 According to JobsOhio, it will use liquor profits 
to “[f]und ongoing economic development activities, including 
marketing, business development incentives, operations, and equity 
investments in targeted industries.”113 As one media outlet notes, 
“[JobsOhio] will capture billions of dollars in state funds and—in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
considering job retention, expansion, and location in Ohio. It also structures incentive packages 
and manages investment projects through various stages of approval.” Id. at 10. The report 
identifies the funding as “GRF, Facilities Establishment Fund or in the future, private funds.” Id.  
109 Id. at 10–11. 
110 MATTERA ET AL., supra note 62, at 9. 
111 Id. at 9–10. 
112 See supra Part I.B (analyzing how article VIII, sections 4 and 6 have been interpreted to 
prohibit subsidies for commerce or industry). 
113 JOBSOHIO, STABLE, SUSTAINABLE FUNDING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, available 
at http://www.ohioeda.com/pdf/mandiedirect/jobsohiofunding.pdf (emphasis added).  
 2/13/2012 4:05:38 PM 
2012] FASTER. CHEAPER. UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 937 
biggest departure from the past—will invest in private firms, taking 
ownership stakes much like a venture capital firm does.”114 
JobsOhio’s use of public funds for equity investments in targeted 
industries violates the plain text of section 4, which forbids the state 
from becoming “a joint owner, or stockholder, in any company or 
association, in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any purpose 
whatever.”115 By placing public funds in equity ventures, the state 
becomes a stockholder in such companies, in direct violation of the 
constitution’s text.  
In addition, JobsOhio will also have what it calls “Close the Deal 
Funds,” which it describes as “[a]ny type of additional funding 
required to retain or attract businesses.”116 This type of direct 
financing constitutes a joint business venture, which Ohio courts have 
struck down. In Ryan, the Ohio Supreme court invalidated the public 
financing of an industrial park, noting it “[was] as much a joint 
enterprise as if the city . . . had given the money directly to the 
corporations to develop the land, to construct their buildings and to 
carry on their activities in the industrial park.”117 In addition to 
violating the prohibition on joint ventures, discretionary funds are 
also at risk of being used for private financial gain of the sort 
invalidated in State ex rel. Wilson v. Hance.118  
Ohio’s use of discretionary cash to fund business ventures is also 
fraught with the type potential abuse that underscored the adoption of 
article VIII, sections 4 and 6 of the Ohio Constitution in 1851.119 
Prior to the adoption of these provisions, public officials used 
taxpayer money to fund speculative ventures, and it was the public 
that suffered when these ventures failed or resulted in corruption and 
waste, at the taxpayer’s expense.120  
Lastly, JobsOhio’s funding stream, as well as the use of “Close the 
Deal Funds,” and investment in equity investments, place public 
funds at risk for speculative uses, in prohibition of article VIII. As 
one Ohio court notes, article VIII “express[es] concern with placing 
                                                                                                                 
114 Holthaus, supra note 1. However, if and when JobsOhio will begin making equity 
investments is not entirely clear. One media outlet reported that “in a press conference after the 
presentation, Kvamme said it has not been formally decided whether JobsOhio will take that 
step of actually taking investment stakes in promising firms.” David Holthaus, Kwamme [sic]: 
DOD Still Has a Role, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Aug. 26, 2011), 
http://news.cincinnati.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/AB/20110825/BIZ/308250082/ (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
115 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4. 
116 Dep’t of Dev. Report, supra note 73, at 15. 
117 Id. at 210.  
118 159 N.E.2d 741, 747 (Ohio 1959). 
119 See supra Part I (providing background on constitutional provisions)  
120 See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.  
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public tax dollars at risk to aid private enterprise” and aims to prevent 
putting state tax dollars “at risk in unwise investments.”121 Of 
particular concern is JobsOhio’s funding stream, which relies in part 
on financing from speculative investments: 
$61 million in liquor profits earmarked for other programs are 
supposed to be offset by annual annuity payments that 
JobsOhio will be required to make to the state. What all of 
these numbers really mean is that a JobsOhio deal must be 
priced and timed just right or taxpayers will have bartered a 
steady earner for a speculative investment. Determining 
what’s “just right” won't be easy, however, because the 
JobsOhio law, while prescribing some forms of what might 
generously be termed openness, explicitly shields JobsOhio 
from open-records and open-meetings laws.122 
JobsOhio’s funding is reliant on the program’s ability to make 
sufficient annuity payments, a precarious arrangement that is the type 
of financial risk that sections 4 and 6 seek to limit. In addition to 
potential risks with the financing arrangement, JobsOhio’s use of 
discretionary cash, without some type of limit on its use, could also 
result in speculative uses of public finances that article VIII aims to 
prohibit.  
C. JobsOhio’s Status as Nonprofit Entity Fails to Remedy 
Constitutional Concerns 
While in some instances the state can administer funds to a private, 
nonprofit entity without violating article VIII, sections 4 and 6, this 
nonprofit status alone is not dispositive. The courts have upheld 
financing of nonprofits when the scheme did not involve business 
ventures, but instead provided a service (such as the processing of 
veteran’s claims).123 Additionally, in those instances where courts 
have upheld public financing of nonprofits, the government had total 
ownership and did not subject public funds to private gain.124 For 
those reasons, JobsOhio’s nonprofit status is not enough to remedy 
the constitutional flaws previously discussed, including joint 
                                                                                                                 
121 Grendell, 764 N.E.2d 1067, 1073. 
122 Opinion, Close Scrutiny for JobsOhio, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 29, 2011, at G2.  
123 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 128 N.E.2d 59, 66–67 (Ohio 1955) 
(upholding enactment of the General Assembly of Ohio to appropriate funds for veterans 
organizations that provide services designed to promote the rehabilitation of veterans). 
124 See supra Part I.B.1.c for full discussion.  
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ownership between the state and private enterprise and the subsidy of 
commerce, in violation of sections 4 and 6.  
D. Article VIII, Section 13 is Inapplicable to JobsOhio.  
Finally, as explained in Part II.B, the one exception to article VIII, 
sections 4 and 6 is section 13, which allows the government to 
promote economic development by acquiring, constructing, selling, or 
leasing industrial or commercial property or facilities.125 However, 
JobsOhio’s plans do not describe economic development in terms of 
the state’s acquisition and development of property, but rather as 
equity investments in corporations.126 For this reason, H.B. 1 does not 
implicate article VIII, section 13, and therefore sections 4 and 6 apply 
with full force to any analysis of JobsOhio.  
CONCLUSION 
Many of the reasons that nineteenth-century Ohioans initially 
sought to prohibit public investment in private enterprise—concerns 
of inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, corruption, favoritism and fraud—
are the same type of issues other states have experienced in the 
previous twenty years with entities designed similar to JobsOhio.127  
Indeed, this Comment’s analysis of H.B. 1 reveals that it may very 
well be a twenty-first century “plunder law” and concludes that 
multiple provisions of H.B. 1, including provisions that allow for 
joint-ownership between the state and private entities, loss of 
governmental decision making and authority, and subsidies to 
commerce, violate article VIII, sections 4 and 6 of the Ohio 
Constitution.128 Ohio would be wise to heed the lessons of the past129 
                                                                                                                 
125 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
126 Indeed, the Ohio Department of Development intends to keep the Urban and Site 
Development Office and the Housing and Partnerships Office under the control of the state. See 
OHIO DEP’T OF DEV., JOBSOHIO 14 (Sept. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.development.ohio.gov/JobsOhioRollout (follow “Central Region Presentation in 
Columbus” hyperlink).  
127 See Rubin, supra note 15, at 397 (citing Alfred F. Conard, Cook and the Corporate 
Shareholder: A Belated Review of William W. Cook’s Publications on Corporations, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1724, 1735 (1995)) (describing one scholar’s account of railroad investment issues, that 
“through ‘practices of rate discrimination, favoritism, wastefully duplicated lines, stock 
gambling, frauds on investors, monopolies and political corruption’ constituted an ‘aid to 
plutocracy [and] a danger to the republic.’”. Similarly, Good Jobs First summarizes the major 
problems with PPPs as the following: “[T]he track record of those few states that have taken the 
step is filled with examples of misuse of taxpayer funds, political interference, questionable 
subsidy awards, and conflicts of interest. Rather than making economic development activities 
more effective, privatization often is little more than a power grab by governors and powerful 
business interests.” MATTERA ET AL., supra note 62, at i. 
128 See supra Part III (discussing Application of Ohio’s Constitutional Provisions to 
JobsOhio). 
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and prevent placing the public tax dollar and the public trust at risk 
with a precarious investment in a private enterprise such as JobsOhio.  
SARAH OSMER† 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
129 See generally Part I (discussing Historical Background on Ohio Constitutional article 
VIII). 
† J.D. Candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.A., 2000, 
University of Michigan. Many thanks to Chris DiMattina for his constant support and good 
humor. 
